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The Internet world is rapidly progressing from a wired era to a wireless era. New 
security schemes are designed for this transition. Fully Distributed Certification 
Authority (FDCA) is one such scheme that enables self-security in wireless Ad-hoc 
networks. FDCA distributes the responsibility of issuing certificates to a needy to all 
the nodes in the network thus improving availability. But this scheme demands several 
assumptions which are real cons to this scheme. One such assumption is that the node 
needing certificate should at least have a predefined constant number of nodes at any 
time, which is really not assured and not possible at all times. To enhance the FDCA 
scheme, a multi-hop authentication scheme has been proposed and analyzed. This 
scheme ensures availability and uses the bandwidth effectively. 
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I.I Wireless Networks 
The success of wired computer networks has urged researchers to converge 
their interest towards the next level of technology research, Wireless networks. The 
history of wireless networks started in the 1970s and the interest has been growing 
ever since. During the last two decades, and especially lately, the interest has almost 
exploded probably because of the fast growing Internet. Today we have two kinds of 
wireless networks. The first kind and most used today is a wireless network built on-
top of a ''wired" network and thus creates a reliable infrastructure wireless network. 
Hnrdwaro 
Accc~s Poinl 
Figure 1 Wireless LAN. 
As seen in the figure 1 the wireless nodes also connected to the wired 
network and able to act as bridges in a network of this kind are called base-stations. 
An example of this as seen in figure. I, there is one access point for three computers, 
two of them are laptops. 
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The person using the laptop can move around connected only within in the 
range of the wireless access point. Once the laptops are out of the range of the 
access point, they get disconnected from rest of the computers. Other more recent 
networks of this kind are cell phones. Once the cell phone gets out of the range of a 
tower, they hang-up and try to connect to the next tower nearby. These networks are 
also called Wireless Local Area Networks (WLAN). 
The other kind of wireless network is one where there is no infrastructure at all 
except the participating mobile nodes. This is called an infrastn,ctures network or 
more commonly an ad hoc network. The word ·'ad hoc" can be translated as 
"improvised" or "not organized". Hence the name Adhoc networks 
1.2 Adhoc Networks 
Figure 2 Adhoc Network. 
Unlike traditional networks adhoc networks do not have fixed infrastructure 
or mobile switching centers. They are dynamic, peer-to-peer networks in which 
hosts rely upon each other to keep the network connected through wireless links and 
routing performed by mobile and fixed nodes. 
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As seen in the figure 2 an Adhoc network consists of a number of computers 
each equipped with a wireless networking interface card. Each computer can 
communicate directly with all of the other wireless enabled computers. They can 
share files and printers this way, but may not be able to access wired LAN 
resources, unless one of the computers acts as a bridge to the wired LAN using 
special software. 
1.2.1 Applications of Adhoc Networks 
Adhoc networks are suitable for certain applications. These include military 
engagements, disaster recovery operations and conferences. For military 
engagements, many military units are in constant motion and these units are 
vulnerable to destruction by enemies. Therefore military units would want to 
communicate using networks which do not have a fixed infrastructure and are very 
much mobile. Adhoc networks therefore are the ideal choice for this application. 
In disaster recovery operations there is a high chance that an existing base 
station might be destroyed by natural calamities. Since communication is very vital 
in those situations, a baseless network with high mobility would be desirable. 
Meetings and conferences may require data transfer between members 
independent of their locality. If a wired conventional network is used, a lengthy and 
troublesome setup process would be required. Adhoc networks can be of great use in 
such situations. 
3 
1.3 Adhoc Network Security 
The growing commercial and military deployment of these networks has 
made security design incresingly important. But providing security in adhoc 
networks is challenging due to the fact that the mobile nodes are dynamic and 
largely autonomous. 
1.3.1 Security goals 
In trying to realize and incorporate more safety features into mobile 
networks, the following issues have to be addressed:-
1) Availability: Availability ensures that the network survives despite 
Denial of Service (DOS) attacks. On physical and media access control 
layer, an attacker can use jamming techniques to interfere with the 
communication on the physical channel. An attack on the network layer 
can disrupt the routing Protocol. Attacks on higher layers could bring 
down high level services such as the key management service. 
2) Confidentiality: Confidentiality means no unnecessary information 
should be leaked out of the network and no unauthorized agents should 
be allowed within the network snooping around for information. 
3) Integrity: For integrity to be maintained, the information 1s 
sent/received between mobile nodes has to maintain the same state as 
before it was sent/received, and is not corrupted. 
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4) Authentication: Authentication enables a node to ensure the identity of 
the peer node it is communicating with. Without authentication ,an 
attacker would impersonate node thus gaining unauthorized access to 
resources and sensitive information and interfering with the operation of 
other nodes 
5) Non-repudiation: Non-repudiation ensures that the originator of a 
message cannot deny having sent the message. This would aid in 
isolating and locating of compromised nodes. 
6) Accountability: This means that the actions of an entity must be 
traceable uniquely to that entity. 
1.3.2 Wireless security Threats, Challenges and Attacks 
Due to the fact that mobile nodes are largely autonomous, they are easy prey 
to being captured, or hijacked by possible viruses and worms. A case in example 
would be the Internet worm, Code Red, which spread rapidly to infect many of the 
Windows-based server machines. Many intra-networks run by companies rely on 
firewalls to fight off the worm. However, there were multiple incidents where the 
Code Red worm was caught from within the intra-network, and this was largely due 
to the fact that these networks also employed mobile computing, i.e. mobile nodes 
moving in and out of the intra-network topology, made them susceptible to the 
outside attacks. 
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Hence, mobile wireless networks are more prone to physical security threats 
than fixed line connections. These threats include eavesdropping, spoofing, and 
denial-of service (DoS) attacks. Nodes may also be hijacked by other malicious 
nodes. There are also cases of security breaches where the offending mobile node is 
unaware that it is sending out malicious codes to other nodes. Of course, other 
reasons for threatening the security of a network (mobile or fixed) could be due to 
employee sabotage (intra-corporation) or industrial espionage (inter-corporation). 
All of these represent potential threats in wireless networks. 
These threats, if executed smoothly and successfully, can bring down an 
entire organization's system, and more importantly, place its data at risk. Sensitive 
information could be breached and disclosed to unintended organizations. 
To summarize, wireless networks face the entire existing security problems 
faced by wired networks, as well as additional security threats that are unique to 
wireless networks. The following is a condensed list (but not limited to) of the 
salient threats and vulnerabilities of wireless networks: 
1) An attacker would impersonate a node thus gaining unauthorized access to 
resources and sensitive information and interfering with the operation of 
other nodes 
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2) When a node is stolen or compromised it may cause Denial-of-service 
attacks by not forwarding packets to other nodes or not sharing neighboring 
node information. 
3) It is easier to steal wireless devices like PD As and hand phones. This is 
therefore a much greater chance of being stolen and personal information 
being revealed. 
4) Malicious entities may launch attacks on other organizations through some 
wireless networks, thereby masking its identity. 
5) Introduction of viruses and malicious codes into a wireless network. 
6) Extraction of data without detection. 
7) Interception of sensitive information through wireless networks that is not 
encrypted. 
Some of the above listed threats and vulnerabilities are also in wired 
but these threats are much more difficult to deal with in wireless networks due 
to the changing topology and also due to availability of many attack points 
due to wireless nature. 
t .3.3 Security Attacks 
Attacks on networks can be classified under two large categories, namely 
active attacks & passive attacks.A passive attack would be one in which an 
authorized party simply gains access to an asset and does not modify its content., e.g. 
7 
eavesdropping. Passive attacks can be either simply eavesdropping or traffic 
analysis. 
I) Eavesdropping - The attacker simply monitors transmissions for message 
content. An example of this attack is a person listening into the 
transmission on a LAN between two workstations or tuning into 
transmissions between a wireless handset and a base station. 
2) Traffic analysis - The attacker gains intelligence by monitoring the 
transmissions for patterns of communication. A considerable amount of 
infom1ation is contained in the flow of messages between communicating 
parties. 
An active attack is one whereby an unauthorized party makes modifications 
to a message, data stream or a file. Without a doubt, active attacks deal double the 
damage than their passive counterparts. Active attacks may take the form of one of 
four types ( or a combination): masquerading, replay, message modification and 
DoS. 
1) Masquerading - The attacker impersonates an authorized user and 
thereby gains access to some authorized privileges. 
2) Replay - The attack monitors transmissions through traffic analysis and 
retransmits the message originally sent by as the legitimate user. 
3) Message modification - The attacker alters a legitimate message by 
deleting, adding to, changing or reordering it. 
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4) Denial of Service - The attacker prevents or prohibits the normal use or 
management of resources such as communication facilities. 
All risks against the IEEE Wireless 802.11 protocol are the result of one or 
more of these attacks. Theconsequences of these attacks include loss of proprietary 
information, legal and recovery costs, tarnished images, and loss of network service. 
1.3.4 Key Management 
Cryptographic schemes such as digital signatures are often employed to 
protect both routes and as well as data .. Digital signature is the electronic equivalent 
of a handwritten signature. It assures the recipient, that the data has not been altered 
or substituted. Digital signatures are explained in detail in the chapter 2. Every node 
in the network owns a public key and a private key pair. Public key is well known to 
all the nodes in the network and the private key is kept secret by the owner. Data 
encrypted using a public key can be decrypted only using the owner of the 
respective private key pair. This scheme is called as public key infrastructure. The 
public key infrastructure is studied in detail in next chapter. 
A key management service or otherwise called as certification authority 
(CA) is a server node which issues the public-private key pair and the certificate., to 
other nodes in the network. A certificate is a piece of data which says that the node 
owning the private key is legitimate and trustworthy for a fixed time. A key 
management service managed by a centralized server is not a good idea for Adhoc 
networks because, the sever (certification providing authority - CA) may not be 
available to issue the private-public key pair to other nodes to establish a secure 
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connection. Moreover if the CA is compromised, the attacker can sign any erroneous 
certificates with the private key. Naive replication of CA to increase the availability 
of CAs can make the network more vulnerable because compromising of a single 
CA can cause the whole system to fail. One approach to solving the single CA 
problem is to distribute the trust to a set of nodes by letting these nodes share the 
key management responsibility. This distribution is achieved using a technique 
called threshold cryptography which is detailed in chapter 2. However, threshold 
cryptography may result in an unacceptable number of nodes not obtaining a 
certificate. The objective of our work is to increase the success rate of obtaining 
certificates by proposing a novel multi-hop threshold certificate scheme. To increase 
the success rate, we introduce the multi-hop authentication technique, whereby we 
not only request the neighboring nodes for partial keys, but also nodes request nodes 
at multiple hops. 
The organization of rest of this thesis is as follows. In Chapter 2, background 
information on Key Management is provided. Chapter 3 describes the two important 
key management schemes in Adhoc networks. The typical problems in existing Key 
management scheme in adhoc network are discussed in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5, the 
description of the proposed enhancement to an existing key management scheme is 
given. Chapter 6 evaluates the performance of the proposed approach, and in the last 
Chapter the thesis is concluded with pointers for future research. 
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Chapter 2 
Background: Key Managetnent 
2.1 Definition and Overview 
The purpose of Key establishment is to create a common key for a group of two 
or more participants to be used for encryption and authentication of their 
communications. Key Management can be defined as "The set of technique and 
procedures supporting the establishment and maintenance of keying relationship between 
authorized parties" [ 1 ]. In the above definition the keying relationship can be defined as 
a state where communicating entities share common data to facilitate cryptographic 
techniques. 
One aspect of key establishment protocol is key distribution, which means that the 
key is generated by one party and distributed to other participants. Key management 
contains techniques and procedures supporting the following, 
• Initialization of system users within domain 
• Generation, distribution and installation of keys. 
• Controlling the use of keys. 
• Update, revocation and destruction of keys. 
• Storage, backup/recovery and archival of keys 
The most popular key management scheme presently used is Public key infrastructure 
(PKJ). Before delving in detail of PKI, the cryptography techniques used in PKI are 
described below. 
I 1 
2.2 Asymmetric Encryption 
An asymmetric encryption system 1s a system involving two related 
transformations - one defined by a public key (the public transformation) based on RSA 
cryptography developed at MIT in 1970, and another defined by a private key (the private 
transfonnation). The essential property of asymmetric encryption is that it is 
computationally infeasible to determine the private key from the public key. Public key 
are used for encrypting data and Private Key is used to decrypt it and vice versa. 
Essentially, with a public key pkuser and private key skuser, the plain text message (m) 
can be encrypted to obtain the cipher text where E stands for encryption and D stands for 
decryption. 





lobe ................ . ~ 









to be ................ . 
j At receiver's end j 
In the figure 3 Epkuser ( ) and Dskuser ( ) are the encryption and 
decryption functions. Some of the popular public key algorithms are Diffie-Hellman and 
RSA. The purpose of developing this technique was to address the problems of using one 
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key for both encryption and decryption, as it is done in the more traditional symmetric 
encryption. 
2.3 Digital Signature 
Digital signatures are very important part of digital certificates. A digital 
certificate is a statement issued by a trusted party that verifies the ownership of a public key 
to that of a user. The trusted party digitally signs this statement and therefore anyone with the 
authentic public key of that trusted party can verify the certificate. Digital signature is the 
electronic equivalent of a handwritten signature. It assures that the recipient that the data 
has not been altered or substituted. Digital signatures use public key cryptography: in its 
simplest form the sender encrypts the message with the sender's private key. The receiver 
decrypts the message with the sender's public key. The receiver is therefore confident 
that the sender is who he claims to be, since only that particular sender has the private 
key to encrypt the message. Since the private key is used for encryption, the signature 
will be different for each user, and the message cannot be forged. 
In a typical scheme, there are two steps that must take place in order to obtain a 
digital signature: 
1. A hash is created from the data (for example, a message) being sent. It is a 
sequence of O's and 1 's and commonly has a length of 128 bits. This hash cannot 
be reverse-engineered; that is, it cannot be used to determine what the original 
data was. 
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2. The hash is then encrypted using the author's private key. The result is the digital 
signature. 
The recipient decrypts the digital signature using the specific author's public key 
and checks to verify that the message creates the same hash. A different hash indicates 
that the message has been tampered with. 
2.4 Digital Certificates 
A digital certificate is a statement issued by a trusted party that verifies the owner of 
a public key is that user. The trusted party digitally signs this statement and therefore anyone 
with the authentic public key of that trusted party can verify the certificate and therefore, use 
the public key therein and be sufficiently sure that it belongs to the owner mentioned in the 
certificate. A certificate always contains at least three pieces of information: the name of the 
owner, the public key, and a digital signature computed over those other two. 
Certificates can use any digital signature mechanism, although most commercial 
system uses the RSA algorithm. Without the signature to check, an attacker could substitute 
one public key for another and masquerade as one person or another in a data exchange using 
public keys. Any end entity must have a copy of CA 's public key in order to check a 
certificate's digital signature. 
Digital certificates also carry additional information, which are optionally included 
for extra security checkup like publishing date, data of revocation, user certificate serial 
number etc. These help to detect forgery and prevent active attacks. 
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The purpose of the digital certificate is to state that the information on the certificate 
has been attested by another entity. This attestation helps to establish the accuracy and 
authenticity of the public key, therefore by implication the authentication and confidentiality 
of any message that can be verified with this public key. 
An important thing to remember about digital certificates is that they verify the 
identity of the person you are dealing with, in the other words, the certificate confirms that 
the person is who he claims to be. But it does not provide any assurance about the integrity of 
the person or that the transaction that you make with someone with a digital certificate will 
be honored. 
There are four components to a generic certificate [2]: 
1) The owner's identity. 
2) The owner's public key. 
3) Certification Authority (CA) information: the certification authority, date of issue, 
expiry, etc. 
4) The digital signature, obtained by hashing the previous three components and the 
CA's private key. 
The certificate can be verified by using the CA's public key. 
2.5 Certificate Authorities (CA) 
To simplify the idea of digital certificates., one can think of them as passports. 
Like passports., they identify a person., as well as encode other personal information. 
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Additionally, there are security features to aid in the prevention of forgery. Consequently, 
Certificate Authorities are comparable to passport offices since they are the organizations 
that verify the identity of an individual and provide them with a unique certificate. 
2.6 Public Key Infrastructure(PKI) 
PK.I is the combination of various technologies, infrastructure and practices 
needed to enable the use of public key encryption and digital signatures in distributed 
applications on a significant scale. The main purpose of PK.I is to distribute keys 
accurately and reliably from the certificate authority to those who need the public-private 
key pair. PK.I also covers certificate renewal, revocation, status checking and private key 
backup and recovery. 
2.6.1 
PK.I performs the following three basic functions: 
1. Authentication: It validates the identity of the parties in communication 
and transactions 
2. Confidentiality: It ensures that information, even if intercepted, cannot 
be unused by unintended recipients. 
3. Non-repudiation: It ensures that transaction once committed is binding 
and irrevocable. 
How PKI works? 
When two parties want to communicate over internet or network~ usmg PKI 
ensure the confidentiality and security of their transaction. Both should have digital 
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certificate. To obtain a certificate, both parties have to request to the certification 
authority. The certification Authority issues a digital certificate to both parties using the 
public key infrastructure. The certification contains the details such as the public key m 
the certificate's expiration date and CA's digital signature. Both parties also get the 
private key corresponding to their public key from the CA. 
Now both parties can send information to each other very securely. When one 
party wants to send a message to the other, the message is encrypted using the other 
party's public key and uses the private key of sender to create digital signature. When the 
receiver receives the message, it is decrypted using the receiver's private key and verified 
using the digital signature. The following table illustrates how PK.I works, 
Intension Action 
Sender want to send a secure Sender creates Digital signature usmg 
message over internet this private key. 
Sender want to make sure no Sender encrypts the message usmg 
other than intended receiver receivers public key 
should read to message 
Receiver want to read the Decrypts using his private key and reads 
message 
Receiver wants to verify that Uses the public key of sender to verify 
the message was not modified the sender's digital signature. 
during transmission. 
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In the next chapter we explain the Key management schemes presently proposed 
for Adhoc networks. 
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Chapter 3 
Key Manageinent Sche01es in Adhoc Networks 
3.1 Overview 
Popular network authentication architectures using a centralized Certificate 
Authority (CA) work fine in a wired networks, but are not suitable for ad hoc networks. 
Nodes in an adhoc network cannot rely on any infrastructure, either in terms of routing, 
servers or organizational support. Therefore ad hoc networks cannot rely on the 
availability of one particular central server. If the CA becomes unavailable, nodes cannot 
retrieve the public keys of other nodes in order to establish secure communications and 
the system is compromised. 
Several protocols have already been proposed to implement key mechanisms in 
ad hoc networks. Some consider distributing the functionality of the centralized CA 
server among a group of servers, so that availability could be improved by avoiding a 
single point of failure whereas other prefer avoiding the use of a centralized authority by 
letting the nodes organize themselves 
When distributing the CA authority to a group of servers, a simple replication of 
the central server would make the system even more vulnerable as an attacker would only 
need to compromise one of these servers. To cope with this issue, security functions~ 
sharing has been a very active research area in cryptography. 
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Threshold cryptography sharing [ 4] serves as a basic primitive because it allows 
securely sharing the system private key. The concept of proactive secret sharing is also 
used to further improve the robustness of the threshold secret sharing by periodically 
updating the secret shares. 
Some other protocols prefer, on the other hand, establishing a secure key 
exchange without using either any certificates or authority. The idea is therefore to let the 
users organize themselves and derive a key session from a password or some other ways 
to ensure authentication. We do not discuss these schemes and protocols below. 
We will discuss in detail about two of the most important certificate authority 
schemes related to this thesis below. These schemes efficiently distribute the Certificate 
Authority function to mobile nodes in the network. Under the techniques used in these 
schemes, the encryption key (private key of the Certificate authority) is divided into 
several parts and distributed to nodes of the network. If K such shares of the encryption 
key can be acquired, the original key can be reconstructed. This concept of dividing the 
key among the mobile nodes is known as 'Threshold Cryptography'. But when a node 
constructs the private key using k share of such acquired shares, there is a high risk that 
the node may be compromised, which breaks the whole network's security. 
A simple solution to this problem is to not reconstruct the private key by 
acquiring k shares, instead whenever a certificate is needed to be generated each secret 
key holder generates a partial certificate over the data. By collecting k such partial 
signatures or certificate the node that needs to be authenticated generates a full signature 
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or certificate. This partial signature generated by combining k shares 1s known as 
'Thershold Digital signature'. 
Applying Threshold digital signature to the public key infrastructure (PK.I) in 
adhoc networks presents s solution to the key management problem by dividing the 
certificate authority's functionality among n mobile nodes. Each of the nodes carries a 
partial share of the CA's private key. Whatever a client requires obtaining a certificate 
from the CA, it must contact all the nodes in its neighborhood. If at least K of these 
neighboring nodes reply with the partial certificates, then the partial certificates are 
combined to form a full certificate. 
There are several Certificate authority schemes proposed for adhoc network. The 
most important of them which are related to this thesis are 
1) Partially Distributed Certificate Authority scheme. 
2) Fully Distributed Certificate Authority scheme. 
3.2 PARTIALLY DISTRIBUTED CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY 
This solution has been proposed by Zhou and Haas [5] and then by Yi and 
Kravets in two papers [6] [7]. Their solution is to distribute the services of a certificate 
authority to a set of nodes by letting them share the key management responsibility 
through the use of threshold cryptography. 
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3.2.1 System Description 
In this solution, the system as shown in the figure 4 contains four types of nodes: 
dealer, clients, servers and combiners, each of them having a public/private key pair. 
1. Dealer: The administrative authority responsible for initializing the network. 
2. Client: A normal node in the ad hoc network, which queries server nodes for 
certificates. 
3. Server: CA nodes, which store certificates in a directory structure and generate 
partial certificates in response to client requests. 
4. Combiner: These are CA nodes too, responsible for combining the partial 
certificates into valid ones. 
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Figure 4 Partially Distributed Certificate Authority 
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The certificate authority service also has a public/private key pair. All nodes in 
the system know the public key of the service and trust any certificate signed by the 
corresponding private key. This corresponding private key, which is the certificate 
signing key skcA, is divided into n shares (st, s2 ... sn), using Shamir's secret sharing 
scheme, that are then distributed to a number of particular nodes called servers ( or 
MOCA standing for MObile Certificate Authority). These servers know the public keys 
of all nodes in the network and store their corresponding certificates. They are also 
responsible for generating partial signatures for these certificates using their share of the 
signing key. 
Finally, the combiner nodes are responsible for generating a valid certificate using 
the different partial certificates generated. (Note: combiners are one of the solutions 
proposed by Zhou and Haas. In the other implementation, clients combine themselves the 
partial certificates). 
3.2.2 System Maintenance 
Initialization 
Distribution of trust in this solution is accomplished by the use of a (n, k) 
threshold scheme, which means that the certificate signing key skcA is divided into n 
shares and that only k nodes (with k<n) are required to jointly perform the signing 
operation. K can be chosen between 1 and n. Setting k to a higher value has the effect of 
making the system more secure against possible adversaries since k is the number of 
MOCAs an adversary needs to compromise to break the system. At the same time, a high 
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value of k can cause more communication overhead for clients as they need to contact at 
least k servers to get certification services. 
One of the other major challenges is to choose which nodes will be part of 
the distributed CA. In general, this set of nodes could be randomly chosen from the nodes 
in the network, but with such an approach, it is possible that the chosen nodes would not 
be able to perform correctly their tasks as nodes generally have heterogeneous 
capabilities. It is then better that the nodes chosen to be part of the CA should have a high 
level of security, jointly with high processor or memory resources. 
The system has an administrative authority that plays the role of a dealer. It is the 
only entity that has the knowledge of the complete certificate signing key and is in charge 
of distributing their shares to the n MOCA during the bootstrapping of the network. It 
also provides offline the nodes with their own certificates and the CA's certificate (public 
key). Then, the nodes are independent, in particular for the share update that we are going 
to cover in the following part. 
Share Update 
At periodic intervals the servers update their shares of the CA's private key. A 
proactive threshold cryptography scheme uses share refreshing, which enables servers to 
compute new shares from old ones without disclosing the service private key to any 
server. After refreshing, the servers remove the old shares and use the new ones to 
generate partial signatures. Because old and new shares are independent, an attacker has 
to compromise k servers within a short amount of time to break the whole system. 
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Given n servers, let (s1, s2 ... sn) be an (n, k) threshold scheme sharing the private 
key skcA of the system, each server i having his share si. The share refreshing proceeds as 
follows: first, each server randomly generates a (n, k) sharing of O (sit, si2 .... sin) and 
distributes every sub share sij to server j through a secure link. When a server j gets the 
sub shares (stj, s2j ... Snj), it can compute a new share from these subshares and his old 
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Figure.5.Share update mechanism 
The figure.5 illustrates the share update mechanism. Each server i on the X axis 
generate n sub shares which constitute the ith column in the figure. Then, each server j on 
the Y axis adds all the subshares, which constitute the jth row, with its old one to compute 
its new one. 
Share refreshing must tolerate m1ssmg subshares or erroneous subshares from 
compromised servers. A compromised server may ever send erroneous subshares in order 
to generate invalid shares, or not send any subshare at all. However, nodes can generate 
25 
new shares usmg only k subshares generated by the other servers. Furthermore, for 
servers to detect incorrect subshares, a verifiable secret sharing scheme is used. This 
scheme generates extra public information for each subshare using a one way function 
that can help to testify the correctness of the share. 
3.2.3 Certificate issuing 
An administrative authority provides offline any node that would like to enter the 
network with its own certificate as well as the CA's certificate. The node's certificate is 
thereafter stored in all the server's directories to be available to all the nodes in the 
network. The servers must also have a mechanism of synchronizing their certificate 
directories in the case of update and renewal. 
3.2.4 Certificate Renewal 
The certificates are only valid for a certain amount of time and therefore 
need to be renewed before they expire. When a node whishes to renew its certificate, it 
must request a certificate renewal to a minimum of k servers. If the request is granted, 
each of these k servers generates a partial certificate with a new expiration date. These 
partial certificates are then sent to a combiner that creates the complete certificate and 
then sends it to the servers for them to update their directories. If any of the servers is 
compromised, the partial certificate this server sends will be erroneous and this leads to a 
wrong new certificate. This type of denial of service attack is prevented by verifying the 
partial certificate before accepting it. If the combiner detects an invalid partial certificate~ 
it will ask for another set of partial certificates until a valid certificate is obtained. 
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3.2.5 Limitations of the Partially distributed Certificate Authority 
The Partially Distributed Certificate Authority is a good attempt at solving the 
problem of minimizing the chances of the CA being compromised. However, it is not without 







This solution requires a server and administrative infrastructure and so is 
applicable to only a subset of ad hoc networks, i.e. planned, long-term 
networks. 
It is assumed that a subset of nodes is willing to take on a specialized server 
role. 
As it is based on public key encryption, it requires that all nodes are capable 
of performing the necessary computations. This might be a stringent 
requirement as most mobile nodes are expected to have limited capabilities. 
The lack of a certificate revocation mechanism is the most critical functional 
drawback. Hence, in the case of a compromise, this system would have no 
suitable scheme to deals with security break-ins. 
The issue of routing to server nodes has not been addressed. Since the client 
node is interested in locating any k server nodes, the CA could be given a 
multicast address. 
A network split may occur during the system update phase, causing the two 
disjoint segments to update their shares independently of each other. Later, in 
the case of a re-merger, the servers would have inconsistent shares. 
Therefore, a mechanism must be in place to handle this situation. 
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3.3 FULLY DISTRIBUTED CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY 
This solution is proposed by Luo and Lu in [8] [9]. It also uses a (k,n) threshold 
scheme to distribute the certification authority, but compared to the previous solution, the 
authority is shared by all nodes in the network. Each individual can then take part in the 
certi ti cation process and no differentiation is made between client and server, all nodes 
play the same role and can potentially provide other nodes certification services. Here as 
well, proactive secret sharing mechanisms are used to protect the system from being 
compromised. 
3.3.1 System Description 
In this architecture also, the certification system as a whole has a public/private 
key pair. The public key is assumed to be known by everybody in the network and the 
corresponding certificate-signing key is shared among all the nodes using Threshold 
cryptography scheme. 
Each node is provided with its own certificate, so that nodes without valid 
certificates are treated as adversaries and denied of any network resource. Upon entering i 
a new area, one node exchanges its certificate with all his one-hop neighbors who store it 
in their directories, either in the main part or in their Certificate Revocation List (CRL) if 
the certificate happens to be invalid. Then, every node controls and monitors his one-hop 
neighbors' certificates. 
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A node desiring to obtain another node's certificate needs to send a certification 
request to his one-hop neighbors and waits until it receives at least k answers. Then, after 
receiving k partial certificates, the node can combine them in order to get the target's 
authenticated certificate. The availability of the service is based on the assumption that a 
node has a least k one-hop neighbors at any time . 
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Figure.6. shows the basic architecture of fully distributed Certificate Authority 
scheme. All the nodes in this scheme share the Private Key of the certification authority. 
3.3.2 System Maintenance 
Initialization by the dealer 
During the initial phase, the administrative authority, the dealer, provides the k 
first nodes with their own valid certificate, the system's public key as well as their share 
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of the system private key according to a polynomial of order k-1. Since the dealer is the 
only entity that knows the entire system private key, maintaining a dealer online to 
provide future nodes with the same parameters would compromise the system, as the 
dealer would become the only point of failure. After this initialization phase, the dealer 
simply quits the network and lets the initial nodes handle the next nodes initialization. 
Self initialization 
Any node joining the network after the dealer has left must obtain all the 
parameters detailed above, such as his share of the certificate signing key. However, an 
assumption is made that a node has already been given a certificate. The initialized nodes 
collaboratively initialize other nodes, typically their neighbors. As more and more nodes 
become initialized, all nodes in the network tend to obtain their share of the signing key. 
If vi is not initialized yet, it locates a coalition of nodes among its neighbors and 
broadcasts a request for initialization with the ID of these nodes. Once a node vj receives 
such a request from a node vi, it checks vi's certificate to know whether it's valid. If it 
decides to serve the request (certificate not in the CRL), it computes a partial share Pj for 
vi. By combining k partial shares, the node is initialized with its valid share. 
However, it is insecure for a node Vj to return directly Pj to the node vi, because vi 
could recover vj's share from the partial share Pj. Then, v could recover k partial shares 
and thereafter recover the whole system signing key. To protect such threat, the k nodes 
shuffle their partial shares before sending them to vi, according to a shuffling factor 
previously established between a pair of nodes. 
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Share Update 
As defined in the previous algorithms, proactive secret sharing is used to update 
the signing key shares. This prevents an attacker from discovering enough (k) partial 
signing shares to compromise the whole system, by constraining him to discover them 
within a short period of time. This update is done by distributing a new polynomial to the 
nodes~ 
fupdatc(x) = b1x + b2x2 + ... + bk-IXk-1 
Whose coefficients are then encrypted, signed and flooded in the network. Each 
node then receives {EpkcA(b1), ... , EpkcA(bk-t) } that it can verify using the system's 
public key. Then it computes the new share Sp= fupdate(idp). 
3.3.3 Certificate Retrieval/ Renewal 
Each node in the network holds a partial share of the system's signing key SK 
according to a random polynomial. It is now able to sign partial certificates to users. A 
certificate has a given validity period, and needs to be renewed before it expires. 
The certification retrieval/renewal mechanism is the same as for self-
initialization. For a node vi to renew its own certificate or to retrieve any other node's 
certificate, it contacts a coalition of nodes among its one-hop neighbors and waits for k 
responses, hence k partial certificates. A node vj answering the request first checks the 
requesting node vi's current certificate. If it is not a convicted node in its CRL ( certificate 
already revoked) or if the certificate is not yet expired, vj accepts to serve the request and 
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generates a partial certificate using his share of the system's private key before returning 
it to Vi. 
Cerli = (cert)s; mod N, where Si is the node's signing key share 
Upon receiving at least k partial certificates, the requesting node v then combines 
them to generate the certificate and verifies it by checking cert = (CERT)PK mod N (PK 
being the system's known public key). 
This scheme works with any of k nodes within the one-hop neighbors, so that 
some of them can fail to answer without making the whole process fail. Moreover, each 
partial certificate is verified upon arrival, so that a compromised node cannot have any 
influence on the certification process. 
3.3.3 Certificate Revocation and CRL 
The certification revocation mechanism is based on the assumption that all nodes 
monitor their neighbors' certificates and behaviors. Revocation is conducted either if a 
certificate has expired or if a node has had a compromised behavior. In such cases., a node 
stores the given certificate in the Certification Revocation List with a "convicted" 
accusation and forwards the information to its neighbors who then consider the node as 
"suspect". These neighbors first check the accuser's certificate validity and store the 
suspected certificate in their respective CRL's as a "convicted" node as soon as they 
receive a coalition of k "suspicion" accusation. 
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The accusation should be propagated fast enough to prevent a node vi from 
roaming to get certification services (hence renewal) from other nodes who don't know 
yet about it being compromised. However, as certificates have an expiry date, it is useless 
to forward the accusation for a longer period than the actual certificate's validity. In other 
words, after a certain amount of time, as a certificate will anyway be invalid, so it 
becomes meaningless to forward accusation packets about this particular certificate. The 
solution is then to set the Transmitting time level (TTL) of the IP packets containing the 
accusation based on the certificate validity period Teen, the one-hop wireless transmission 
period D and the assumption on maximum node moving speed Smax. TTL > = [Tcerr . 
2 Snuu:} ID. 
3.3.4 Limitations of the fully distributed Certificate Authority 
This solution is an improvement upon the Partially Distributed Certificate Authority 
m that it increases availability, doesn't require any special roles, and, unlike the other 
certificate-based solutions proposed, provides a certificate revocation mechanism. However, 




As with the previous schemes, this solution, too, is aimed towards planned, 
long-term ad hoc networks capable of public key encryption. 
The cost of achieving high availability is a set of rather complex maintenance 
protocols like the share initialization and share update protocols. 
Since every node has its own share, a large number of shares are exposed to 
compromise. The threshold parameter, k, therefore, may have to be chosen 
larger. This, in tum, affects the availability of the service. 
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• The certificate revocation mechanism assumes that each node is willing to 
monitor the behavior of all its one-hop neighbors, which maybe too strong an 
assumption in certain adhoc networks. 
• Again, in the case of a network split during system update, inconsistencies 
may arise. The system must, therefore, provide a synchronization mechanism. 
The problems caused by these limitations described above and our proposed solution is 
presented in next two chapters. 
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Chapter 4 
Problems in Adhoc Key Management ScheIDes 
4.1 Problem Description 
The limitations of the fully distributed certificate Authority are 
identified in the chapter 4. One of these limitations is the problem we address in this 
thesis. "Since every node has its own share, a large number of shares are exposed to 
compromise. The threshold parameter, k, therefore, may have to be chosen larger". If 
the threshold parameter increases, the availability becomes a problem, as the success 
rate for reconstructing a certificate will decrease. Assume a war zone or a natural 
calamity, the mobile nodes are under high risk of being destroyed or compromised. A 
node which needs service for authentication cannot in all situations find k neighboring 
nodes. The existing authentication schemes always assume that the availability of the 
neighboring nodes is always a constant number and that the nodes are always readily 
available in its one hop neighborhood for service. 
There may be situations when the node which needs authentication may not 
have k one hop neighbors available at the time. There would be the situation when 
the node is stuck in one geographical position and there are not many neighboring 
nodes. In the worst case there would be only one one-hope neighbor, in this case the 
nodes will have to trust only mobility and wait until it meets k one-hop nodes arrive 
in the neighborhood. There may even be situations when almost all the neighboring 
nodes are compromised and a denial of service attack exists. 
35 
Our proposal modifies the fully distributed certificate authority scheme by 
contacting multi-hop nodes every time it needs authentication and stores the 
information in a table called K-hop information table. This table stores the hop 
numbers and information about the nodes in each hop. When authentication is 
required, it contacts k nodes in multiple hops instead of just the one hop neighbors. 
This approach allows certificates to be constructed even in the presence of Denial of 
Service attacks as it ensures availability of K nodes needed for issuing partial 
certificate. Our approach therefore not only improves the success ratio, but it also 





5.1 Basic Scheme 
The proposed scheme uses a Multi-Hop authentication technique for Key 
Management. This scheme, is an improvement on the fully distributed certificate 
authority [8], based on a {k, n) threshold scheme, and distributes the certificate authority 
service among all nodes in the network. In an attempt to improve the availability and work 
efficiently against DoS attacks, we have modified fully distribute certificate authority scheme 
proposed by H. Luo et al to use multi-hop nodes for getting k partial certificates instead of 
using only one-hop neighboring nodes to obtain the k partial certificates. 
5.2 System & Adversary Models 
This modified fully Distributed certificate authority scheme like the original 
scheme has mobile nodes which communicate with each other using bandwidth 
constrained, error prone and insecure wireless channels. We assume that the network has 
n mobile nodes where number n is not static and may vary due to several reasons such as 
new nodes joining the network, node leaving or compromised (attacked) over time. The 
reliability of the multi-hop packet forwarding is based on the underlying transport layer. 
The other assumptions are the same as in currently existing scheme [8], 
• Each node has a unique non-zero id number to identify itself to the other 
nodes or neighboring nodes. 
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• Mobility is characterized by a maximum node's maximum moving speed 
which is Smm· 
• To get authenticated each node requires at least k nodes in the neighboring 
or in the reachable multiple hops. 
• Each node is equipped with some local detection mechanism to identify 
the misbehaving nodes among its one hop neighborhood nodes. Some of 
these techniques are proposed in [ 1 O] [ 11]. 
Intrusion detection in Wireless Adhoc networks is more difficult than in the 
wired conventional networks [10]. The technique proposed by [11] shows that detecting 
intrnders and misbehavior in one-hop neighborhoods is much easier than detecting 
intrnders and misbehaviors in multi-hop nodes. 
Like the existing scheme, our proposed scheme handles two kinds of attacks, DoS 
attacks and node Breaks-ins [8]. Adversaries may issue the DoS attacks from various 
layers of the network. The other attacks that are handled include smurf, teardrop, 
transport layer flooding and SYN flooding [8]. The underlying cryptographic techniques 
are assumed to be computationally secure to prevent attackers compromising nodes 
The adversaries are characterized based on the following two models [12] 
• Model I: During the entire lifetime of the network, the adversary cannot 
break into or control k or more nodes. 
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• Model II: Consider time being divided into intervals of length T. During 
any time interval T, the adversary cannot break into or control k or more 
nodes. 
Our scheme like the original scheme works on the model II. 
5.3 Proposed Architecture 
In this section we present the overall architecture. We present the localized trust 
model first and also present the general overview of the whole modified key management 
scheme next. 
5.3.1 Localized Trust Model 
In wired networks key management is done using a dominant localized trusted 
third party [ 13]. In the Trusted third party (TTP) model, a node is trusted only if it is 
authorized by a central certificate authority. While TTP has great efficiency and 
manageability by using centralized system for authentication, [8] it suffers scalability and 
robustness problem as well as a single point of failure. 
Our Localized Trust Model (LTM) is based upon the one proposed by Lou et al 
[8]. In our model an entity or node is trusted only if it is authorized by some k 
neighboring nodes. These may be one hop nodes if there is more than k one hop neighbor 
or they may be multi-hop nodes based up on the density of the nodes in at a particular 
time when the node needs authentication. The solution proposed by Lou et al makes use 
of only the one hop neighbor, whereas our LTM uses only one-hop neighbors if there are 
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at least k nodes in the neighborhood otherwise it makes use of the multi-hop neighbors 
also. 
Two ways to set the k parameter are as follow [8], 
• Global parameter i.e. the value of k stays the same for all nodes thought 
through out the network life. This is otherwise called as system wide trust 
threshold. 
• Location dependent variable, where value of k changes depending upon 
various other parameters such has geographic density, mobility, the 
number of nodes in the network etc. 
There are several complications in setting k as the location dependent variable. 
Although this option provides more flexibility to work in concert with diverse local 
network topologies, [8] there is no system wide trust criterion. Due to the lack of good 
mechanisms to determine a node's neighborhood in a mobile environment, the adversary 
may make take advantage of this defective feature. 
In our architecture we use the first option rather than the second one with a 
network wide fixed k that is tuned according to the network density ad system robustness 
requirement. In the previous model proposed by Lou et al [8], if a node cannot find k 
nodes in the neighborhood, it roams around until it finds k nodes. This means that it may 
take a long time to obtain k partial certificates which is an advantage to the adversary. 
The adversary has more time to attack and may trap a node in some geographic location 
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thereby reducing the mobility of the node. This would in turn slow down or starve the 
node indefinitely from getting a digital certificate. 
Trust management is distributed in both the space (k) and time (Tcert) domains in 
our localized trust model. This property [8] is particularly appropriate for large dynamic 
adhoc wireless networks where the centralized trust management would be difficult or 
expensive. 
5.3.2 Overview 
In our architecture, every node has a pairs of keys, where one pair is the public 
and private key of the prospective node and other is the Secret Key (SK) and Public Key 
(PK) of the certificate authority. Since the PK of the CA is well known to all the nodes in 
the network, every node will have a copy of the PK. PK is used for certificate 
verification. Each node in the network should also carry a valid certificate. A node 
without valid certificate is not allowed to use the recourses of the network [8]. Like the 
original scheme, the nodes forward their certificates to neighboring nodes. Using the 
certificate they make authenticated safe links between them and help each other to route 
data packets or use other node's resources such as files etc. Each node is also monitors 
neighbor nodes to detect possible misbehaviors such as DoS, Break-ins etc. The 
monitoring mechanism used is up to each individual node. 
As in the PKI scheme, each certificate has to be stamped with the expiration time. 
Once the time is expired the nodes should attempt to renew the certificate by requesting a 
new certificate to the CA. In PKI nodes contact the CA, whereas in our scheme the nodes 
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contact the neighboring nodes or the multi-hop nodes depending upon the node density 
since the certificate signing key is distributed among all the nodes in the network. In our 
scheme nodes need at least k nodes to make a new certificate. Once a node receives a 
request from a node for the partial certificate, it checks for records of the requesting node 
in its certificate revocation list (CRL). If the records show that the node is well-behaving 
legitimate node, it returns a partial certificate by applying its share of SK, otherwise the 
request is denied. By collecting K partial certificate, the nodes combine them to form a 
full certificate. 
A valid certificate like the original scheme [8] represents the trust from a coalition 
of k nodes. Nodes with a valid certificate are trusted globally. By distributing certificate 
issuing/renewing service to neighboring and the multi-hop nodes we assure that the 
service is available ubiquitous and robust against DoS attacks. 
5.4 Localized Certificate Services 
In this section we present the localized certificate services. The localized 
certificate services in our scheme uses the same technique dynamic coalescing [8] used 
by Lou et al. A node V; first finds out k nodes out of n nodes in the whole network. 
Coalition [8] can be formulated dynamically from any k responding nodes. 
In general, Adhoc routing protocols can be categorized into two types: (a) 
on-demand and (b) pro-active protocols. 
On-demand protocols create routes only when desired by the source node 
[ 16]. When a node requires a route to a destination, a route discovery process is initiated 
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within the network. Once a route has been established, it is maintained until the route is 
no longer required. 
Pro-active protocols attempt to maintain consistent, up-to-date routing 
in fonnation for all nodes in the network [ 16]. This is typically achieved through 
maintaining a set of routing tables. Changes in network topology brought on by mobility 
or node failures~ are catered for by propagating updates throughout the network at 
periodic intervals to maintain a consistent view. 
One of the popular pro-active protocols is Destination sequenced Distance Vector 
Routing protocol (DSDV) [15]. Since the pro-active protocols are table driven i.e. the 
neighboring node information is stored in a table and updated periodically, networks 
using these protocols will not have any extra overhead in finding out the k-hop 
neighboring nodes. Our proposed scheme will best integrate with DSDV because this 
protocol demands each node to have information about routes to each other nodes in the 
networks including the hop counts. 
Below is the overview of the DSDV routing protocol [ 15] 
• Each Routing Table list all destinations and number of hops to each other 
nodes 
• Each Route is tagged with a sequence number originated by destination 
• Updates are transmitted periodically and when there is any significant 
topology change 
• Routing information is transmitted by broadcast. 
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The figure. 7 below shows an example of an Adhoc network and the contents of 
the routing table of node H6. 
Dest Next Hop Metric Seq.No. Install 
H1 H4 3 S406 H1 T001 H6 -H2 H4 2 s12s:H2 T001 - H6 H3 H4 3 S564_H3 TOD1 H6 
H4 H4 1 S710 H4 T002_H6 
S39::CHs HS H7 3 T001 H6 -
HS H6 0 S076 H6 T001 H6 -H7 H7 1 S128-H7 TOD2 HG 
H8 H7 2 SOSO-HS TOD2-H6 
(b) 
(a) Adhoc network 
(b) The routing table of node H6 at one instant. 
Figure 7 DSDV network and routing table 
Figure 7.a shows the contents of the routing table of H6 at one instant of time. We 
sort the table based on number of hops to store the node information arranged in the order 













































Figure 8 DSDV sorted routing table 
From the table in the figure 8 we can count the number of nodes that can be 
reached in within a certain number of hops. Now in order to have k number of partial 
certificates, we try to contact the first k nodes in the table, this way we make sure there is 
no extra overhead. For example if we need 3 partial certificates, we have to contact 3 
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nodes in its neighborhood that is, nodes H4 and H7 in the first hop and H8 in the second 
hop. 
In our modified scheme, a node H6 finds out the nodes to be contacted for 
certificates from the table in figure. 8. Now the node H6 sends request for the partial 
certificates with a hop limit of 2 and gets the partial certificates. The receive partial 
certificates are combined to form the full certificate. In case of failure because of the 
node break-in mobility or compromises the table is updated. The new hop limit is 
calculated and request is sent with an updated hop limit. This process is repeated until all 
the partial ce11ificates are obtained. 
The other category of protocols in Adhoc networks is pro-active protocols [16]. 
One of the well-known pro-active routing protocols is Dynamic Source Routing (DSR). 
These kinds of routing protocols do not maintain a table of routes to all the nodes in the 
network. For these networks we have proposed the following solution. 
In DSR, the list of neighboring nodes is stored at a node. Only the route 
information is stored. Below is the overview of the DSR route discovery process [ 17] 
• Source broadcasts route-request to Destination 
• Each node forwards request by adding own addresses and broadcasts again. 
• Requests propagate outward until Target is found, or a node that has a route to 
Destination is found. 
• The destination node routes the packet containing route information back to the 
source 
In our modified scheme for proactive Adhoc network protocols, a node V; which 
needs a new certificate or a certificate to be renewed sends a pre-request signal similar to 
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a route discovery request to its neighboring nodes by broadcasting the request. The pre-
request signal is propagated to k hop nodes where k is the certificate shares required to 
create a new full certificate .Once a pre-request signal is received, the receiving node 
sends back an acknowledgement signal to V; with its own list of one-hop neighboring 
nodes infom1ation and broadcasts the pre-request signal to its neighbors and so on until k 
hops where k is the number of partial keys needed. The neighbor nodes information of k 
nodes is stored in k-Hop nodes information table. 
Hops Neighboring Nodes Information. 
1 5, 9, 11, 33 
2 12, 35, 34, 22, 3, 8, 19, 18 
.. ................................................... 
.. . .................................................... 
k 11, 12, 15,22,23,26,44,43,55,29,41,29,28,32 ....... 
Figure 9 k-Hop information table. 
The above table figure 9 is a K-Hop information table. All the one hop neighbors 
return their neighbors to the requesting node. For example, assume the one hop neighbors 
are nodes 5, 9 , 11, 13. These neighbors return their neighbors. For example node 5 
returns its neighbors 12, 3, 19. Node 9 returns its neighbors 3, 18, 35, 34. Node 11 returns 
its neighbors 22, 8, 35, and node 13 returns its neighbors 18, 34, 34, 22. From this 
infom1ation the one hop and two hop neighbors can be constructed as shown above. V; 
waits for Tack time and counts the number of acknowledgements from its neighbor nodes. 
Here Tack is the pre-calculated global constant time which is needed to contact k nodes in 
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the chain and get a reply in tum. If the count of the acknowledgements from neighboring 
nodes is greater than or equal to the threshold value k, then the node V; sends an actual 
request for a partial certificate to all its neighbors with its valid id number specifying the 
number of hops. 
After receiving the actual request the neighboring node checks the Certification 
revocation list for any bad records. If the history of the node V; is clear, then the node 
computes the partial certificate using its share of PK and sends it back to V;. Once all the 
k partial certificates are received the V; combines all them to form a new valid certificate. 
In node V; does not receive k acknowledgements from its neighboring nodes it 
calculates the number of hops to be contacted to get k nodes using the k-hop node 
information table. From the k-hop node information table, the number of hops H to be 
contacted is calculated. Then V; sends a special request to its neighbors. Once Rsp is 
received the nodes pass the request to their neighbors in turn and so on till H hops is 
reached. After passing the request the nodes check for the records of the node Vi and then 
create a partial certificate and sends to the V;. The request Rsp is time stamped and expires 
at Tep time. Each node also adds its id to the request for the partial certificate to trace the 
route back to Vi. 
The certificate Issuing and renewal with Dynamic Coalescing is adapted from 
Lou et al [8]. 
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5.4.1 Certificate Revocation List (CRL) 
In order for any node f1J to authorize V; before it issues a partial certificate, the 
records of the V; should be verified for legitimacy. f1J has to maintain two kinds of records 
[ I 7][ I 8]. One is its direct monitoring data on neighboring nodes and the other is its 
certification revocation list (CRL). Each entry of the CRL has a node id and a list of 
accusers of the node. If the number of accusers is less than the threshold k and greater 
than I then the node is marked "suspect". 
The node "V_; can convict a node in two ways, one by direct monitoring and other 
being accused from k legitimate nodes. Ifby direct monitoring node "V_; finds that the node 
is misbehaving or broken, it marks the node as "convicted" and floods the message to all 
the nodes until Teen time. If there is an accusing node, then before entering this 
information to the CRL, f1J checks if the accusing node is legitimate itself. If the number 
of accusing node is greater thank or equal to k then a node is marked convicted and "V_; 
updates its CRL by taking away the id of the accused nodes from the accusers list of the 
other nodes in the CRL. If the number of accusers drops less than k then the node is 
marked down from "convicted" to "suspect". 
The proposed general Certification Service procedure for the pro-active Adhoc networks 
is given in the following steps, 
1. Node V; requesting a certificate renewal broadcasts pre-request signal Rpre to k 
hop neighboring nodes where k is the number of partial key shares needed to 
make a full certificate. 
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2. On receiving the signal Rpre the K-hop neighboring nodes send neighboring node 
information with acknowledgement. 
3. The node V; saves the nodes information in the K-hop information table. 
4. After waiting Tack time, requesting node V; counts the number of 
acknowledgments N; from its neighbors. If the number N; is equal to or greater 
than the threshold k, then the node V,. broadcasts actual request R to all the 
neighboring nodes. Node V; gets the partial certificates from the one hop 
neighbors and uses Dynamic Coalescing to combine the partial certificates to 
create a full certificate. 
5. If the number N; is less than k then node V; calculates the hops count H from the 
K-hop information table required to obtain k replies. f/_; broadcasts a special 
request Rsp, asking the nodes to pass the request to its neighboring nodes also till a 
limit of H hops. 
6. Once a node V1 receives Rsp, if it is within the H hop neighborhood from the 
requesting V,. node, it broadcasts the Rsp to its neighbor with its id attached to the 
request for the partial certificate. After broadcasting, the Request Rsp is processed 
and V; is checked for legitimacy in the CRL. If it is legitimate, the partial 
certificate is sent to V; using the route in the network. 
7. Every time the Rsp is broadcast, the node sending Rsp adds its id to the Rsp· The 
node receiving Rsp similarly broadcasts Rsp to its neighbor adding its id. A node 
Vi receives a partial certificate from a node V.-i: which is one hop away from Vi, to 
be forwarded to f/_j. Before sending this partial certificate to Vi, Vx checks if the 
route is secured, by verifying the validity of Vi by scaiming Vi's id in its CRL. 
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8. Repeats until H hop neighbors. 
9. After receiving at least k partial certificates the node generates the full certificate. 
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Chapter 6 
Simulation and Results 
6.1 Performance Measures 
To investigate the performance of our proposed solution over the fully 
distributed Certification Authority Scheme, both schemes are studied by varying several 
parameters. The simulation is created by having the area as a 2-D array and randomly 
placing nodes in the array. The required number of key shares (k) to construct a full 
certificate is pre-determined. We assume that we know parameters such as Transmitting-
range and mobility .The simulator then randomly picks a node and attempts to make full 
certificate by getting k partial certificates using both Certification Authority Scheme and 
our proposed solution. We then measure the success and failure rate by the number of full 
certificates obtained among n nodes. 
The following performance measures are used to evaluate the proposed approach 
• Success% measured by the density of nodes in the network 





Success% measured by the transmitting-range(power) 
Success% measured by the percentage of compromised nodes in the 
network. 
Number of Hops required to obtain k shares by the density 
Number of messages by the key shares 
6.2 Steps Involved in simulation 
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l) Create and randomly place nodes m the area represented by the two 
dimensional array. 
2) Start moving the nodes based on the random-walk mobility model 
[20][2 l ][22). The random-walk mobihty mode\ is summarized as be\ow, 
A node moves from its current location to a new location by randomly 
choosing a direction and speed in which to travel. The new speed and 
direction are both chosen from pre-defined ranges, [speedmin ; sp eedmax] 
and [O; 2rr] respectively. Each movement in the Random Walk Mobility 
Model occurs in either a constant time interval t or a constant distance 
traveled d, at the end of which a new direction and speed are calculated. 
3) Randomly choose a node and try to get a full certificate for the node by 
obtaining k partial certificates. Use the fully distributed certificate 
authority scheme and also use our proposed scheme for all n nodes and get 
the average success rate. 
4) Repeat the simulation by varying parameters such as 
i) Density (number of nodes) . 
ii) Power (transmitting-range). 
iii) Percentage of compromised nodes. 
iv) Number of key shares (k). 
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Figure IO Density graph. 
Figure IO compares the success rate of the both fully distributed certificate 
authority and our proposed scheme. Here we vary the density of the nodes with the 
success rate (number of successful full certificates constructed). The other parameters 
such as transmitting range, number of key shares and mobility are constant and chosen as 
3, 3 and I units respectively. The graph clearly shows our proposed solution has higher 
success rate than the original scheme (FDCA). Even at very low densities as low as 5 
nodes in the whole network, our proposed solution was able to produce 20% success 
compared to the original scheme which totally failed at very low density. This result 
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Figure 11 Security graph. 
The figure 11 compares the success rate of both the fully distributed certificate 
authority and our proposed scheme. Here we change the number of key shares required 
by nodes to generate a full certificate. The other parameters such as transmitting range, 
number of nodes and mobility are constant and chosen as 3, 50 and 1 units respectively. 
Higher the number of key shares, higher the security. We varied the number of key shares 
between the range 2 and 15, and tried to measure the success rate of both the fully 
distributed certificate authority and our proposed solution. The graph clearly shows that, 
for as high number of key shares ( 15 key shares) FDCA totally failed whereas our 
proposed scheme had a 60% success. Clearly our proposed solution has better success 
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Figure 12 Power graph. 
Figure 12 shows the success rate of both the fully distributed certificate 
authority and our proposed scheme. Here we vary the power i.e. the transmitting range of 
each node with in the range 1 - 12 units. The other parameters such as number of key 
shares, number of node and mobility are constant and chosen as 3, 50 and 1 units 
respectively. The FDCA totally failed for very low transmitting ranges (1 unit) whereas 
our scheme had 16% success. The graph clearly shows that even at low power, our 
proposed solution works better than the FDCA. 
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Clearly all the three charts given above show that our proposed scheme has better 
success rate than the fully distributed certificate authority (FDCA). Now we introduce 
bad nodes i.e. either compromised or dead nodes which pose denial of service attack or 
other malicious attacks and try to measure the success rate. 
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Figure 13 Compromise Graph. 
Figure 13 shows the success rate of both the fully distributed certificate 
authority and our proposed scheme. Here we change the percentage of compromised 
nodes in each node's neighborhood. We vary the percentage from 5 - 50%. The other 
parameters such as number of key shares, number of node and mobility are constant and 
chosen as 3, 50 and I units respectively. 
The chart clearly shows that the fully distributed certificate authority cannot attain 
100% success rate even for a minimal 5% compromised nodes in its neighbor. Our 
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proposed solution give 100% success rate for 5% compromises and gradually decreases 
as the percentage of compromised nodes increase. The graph shows that our scheme 
always performs better than the fully distributed certificate authority scheme. 
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Figure 14 Hop count graph. 
The figure 14 shows the chart which measures the number of hops required to 
construct a full certificate for various node densities. The fully distributed certificate 
authority will always need one hop to get all k certificates. When FDCA cannot find k 
nodes in its neighborhood, it has to move to another location and try again. Hence FDCA 
will more time than our proposed solutions since our scheme does not rely upon mobility 
for finding k nodes. In other words, even if k neighboring nodes are not available, our 
scheme can immediately start the process of obtaining k partial certificates. This is not 
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true for the FDCA which needs to wait until k nodes appear in its one-hop neighborhood. 
We see that the hops ranges from 4 to I are needed for obtaining 4 key shares on average. 
Though the fully distributed certificate authority schemes seems to have less message 
overhead because of one hop communication , the average success rate is about 58% 
whereas the average success rate for our proposed scheme is about 72%. This chart 
shows the overhead that is incurred to achieve a substantial increase in success rate using 
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Figure 15 Message Overhead graph. 
Figure 15 shows compares the message overhead of both the fully distributed 
certificate authority and our proposed scheme. We vary the number of key shares (k) 
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required to create a full certificate and get the average number of messages required by a 
success node to get k number of partial certificates. The other parameters such as 
transmitting range, number of nodes and mobility are constant and chosen as 3, 50 and I 
units respectively. The maximum number of messages in the FDCA scheme is 5 and 45 
for our proposed scheme. Thought the difference seems to be very high, the average 
success rate was 82% for our proposed scheme and 43% for the FDCA. Also when our 
scheme was used with DSDV there is no extra overhead because it uses only the already 
existing routing table. 
6.4 Results 
Using the simulation the following observations were made on our proposed 
scheme when compared to fully distributed certificate authority. 
• Our scheme substantially increases the success rate in getting a full certificate 
• Our scheme Utilizes more Channel Bandwidth 
• Our scheme gives a better success rate when nodes are compromised. The success 
rate is better even if half the nodes are compromised. Our scheme is much better 
for network survivability. 
• Our scheme gives better success rate even when the simulation is done in closed 
space (when nodes reach the four dead ends of the array, they cannot move 
forward and have to reverse back). 
• Our scheme has faster key management because it does not have to wait until it 




7 .1 Conclusions 
The fully distributed certificate authority cannot be used in all situations 
since an ad-hoc environment is very dynamic and network densities vary. It may not be 
possible to get enough key shares when there are few neighboring nodes . Our proposed 
scheme is well adapted to the highly dynamic nature of ad hoc networks. Consequently 
our multi-hop authentication technique handles many more critical situations such as 
node break-ins, obstacles, node compromises and power failures. The success rate using 
the multi-hop technique is significantly better than the fully distributed certificate 
authority. When implemented with the table driven routing protocols such as DSDV, the 
proposed scheme does not have any extra overhead. Although for proactive networks 
there is an overhead, the average success rate is always greater than the previous scheme. 
7.2 Future Work 
This work can be further improved. 
1. A better technique can be used to limit the number of messages. 
2. We have not investigated how to predict or find out a compromised node. This is 
an area that requires a lot of future research. 
3. Faster technique to handle breaks in the routes discovered, due to faster mobility 
of the nodes. 
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using namespace std; 
//variables defining the x and y axis of the area 
int x=20; 
int y=lO; 
//integer array defining the simulation area 
int **area; 
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//variables defining the maximum and minimum mobility of the nodes 
int maxspeed=3; 
int minspeed= I; 
//average speed of the nodes 
int speed= I; 
//variable defining the transmitting n range of the nodes 
int k=3; 
//variable defining the number ofparitial key defined 
int nbr=3 ;//partial keys 
//variable defining the number of nodes in the network 
int nodes=50; 
long average=O; 
//variable to measure the hop count of each node 
int hops=O; 
//variables to measure the average success rates of the both schemes 
int old_sucess=O; 
int new _sucess=O; 
I /class defining the nodes 
class node; 






int id;//member for node id 
int x;/ /member for node x axis 
int y;/ /member for node y axis 
int t_range;//member for node transmitting range 
int **k_table;//member array to store k-hop neighboring node information 
static int nodenumber;//member to store number of nodes in neighborhood 
node();// constructor 
bool compramised; 
bool move();//member function to make the node move in random when called 
bool updatek_table();//member function to update its k-hop neighborhood table 
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int node: :nodenumber=O;//initializing static variable 
node *terminals I ;//declaring the node pointer to create and allocate nodes 
//implementing the constructor 
node: :node() 
{ 
/ /initializing and creating k-hop table dynamically 
k_table=new int*[nbr]; 
//allocating space 
for( int i=O; i<=nbr;H+) 
k_table[i]= new int[::nodes]; 
//deciding the node is compramised dynamically 




//allocating area for the node created and finding out the neighboring node if the space is 
//occupied then finding a random space until we find one 
while(true) 
{ 
int x_ =rand()%(::x);//randomly generating x space 
int y _ =rand()%(::y);//randomly generating y space 
//finding if it is free and allocationg the node to it 
} 






area[ x_] [y _]=this->id; 
//cout<<x<<" "<<y<<" i"<<area[x_][y _]<<"\n"; 
nodenumber++; 
break;/ !break if found 




//end of constructor 
//implementing the member function to move the node in random 
bool node: :move() 
{ 
//saving the previous location in a new set of variables 
int x I =this->x; 
int y I =this->y; 
/ /finding out the new direction in random 
I /selection I out of 5 number 4 representing 4 directions and 1 for same location 
int r=rand()%5;//random direction 
//changing direction with respect to speed (mobility) 
if(r== I) 
x I =x+speed;//finding out the new direction and distance 
if(r==2) 
y I =y+speed; ;//finding out the new direction and distance 
if(r==3) 
x I =x-speed; ;//finding out the new direction and distance 
if(r==4) 
x I =y-speed; ;/ /finding out the new direction and distance 
//if the new location is same don't change or else find if the space is free and change the 
//location 




area[ this->x] [ this->y ]=-1; 
area[ x 1] [y 1 ]=this->id; 
this->x=x 1 ; 
this->y=y 1 ; 
return O;//retum back 
//end of move function 
/ /implementing the update k -table function 
boot node: :updatek table() 
{ 




{ for( int j=O;j<: :nodes;j++) 
{ this->k _ table[i][j]=-1; 
//saving the new neighbor information in the k-hop table 
} 







//check if the all nodes fall in the range of the transmitting range of the current 







if(area[i][j]!=this->id && area[i][j]!=-1) 
{ 
this->k_table[O][index]=area[i][j];//recording in table 
cout<<"i"<<area[i][j];//printing them 
if(!terminals 1 [area[i][j]].compramised) 
cnt++;//adding the count 
index++;// going to next hop 
I I if the nodes in the neighborhood is greater than or equal to k shares then record 
//success 
if( cnt>=nbr ) 
old_ sucess++;//incrementing 
bool record=false; int indexcount=index; 
int cnt 1 =cnt; 
//recording one hop node count 
//in this loop we recursively go for every node in the hop table and record nodes in the 
//next hop 
for(int il l=l;il l<::nbr;il 1++)//loop until k hops 
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{ 
int index 1 =O; 
//finding the id of each node in the previous hop 
for(int j 1 =O;j 1 <index;j 1 ++) 
{ 
int _x_,_y_; 
for( int i2=0;i2<: :y;i2++) 
for(int j2=0;j2<::x;j2++) 
if(area[i2][j2] this->k_table[il 1-l][jl]) 
{ _x_ =i2; _y_ =j2;}//getting the x,y axis of the node 
//checking if any nodes fall in the range of the selected node, if any record their 
/ /id in the k-hop table 
for( i=O;i<: :x;i++) 
for( int j=O;j<: :y;j++) 




if(area[i][j]!=this->id && area[i][j]!=-1)//checking the area of 
//both nodes 
{ 
for( int i 12=0; i12<=il l ;il 2++) 
//checking the table if the node already exits if it is then ignore else record 
for(int i3=0;k_table[i12][i3]!=-1 ;i3++) 
if(k_table[i12][i3]=area[i]fj]) 
already=true; 
//if not in the table record 
if(!already) 
{ 
this->k_table[i 1 l][indexl ]=area[i][j]; 
cout<<"nbr"<<area[i][j]; 
if( !terminals 1 [area[i][j]].compramised) 
cntl++; 
I !we also record the node hop count 
if(cntl>=nbr && !record) 
{ 
cout<<"cnt"<<cnt 1; 













cnt I =cnt I +cnt; 
/ /updating counts and indexes 
indexcount=indexcount+index; 
} 
/ /checking if the number of nodes in khop is equal or greater than the k share nodes If any 
then record sucess 
if( indexcount>=nbr) 
new_ sucess++; 










//a temporary k table 
int * *k I table· - ' 
/ /initializing the random seed 
srand ( time(NULL) ); 
//initializing the area array 
area=new int*[x]; 
/ /allocationg dynamic area array space 
for ( int i=O; i<x ;i++) 
{area[i]= new int[y];//allocationg 
} 
//initializing the area with -1 indicating empty space (no nodes) 
for( i=O ;i<::x ;i++) 
for( int j=O;j<: :y ;j++) 
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area[i][j]=-1; 
//creating the number of nodes 
node *terminals= new node[nodes]; 
terminals I =terminals; 
//dynamically allocating k table 
kl_table=new int*[nbr]; 
112d array allocation 
for( i=O; i<=nbr;i++) 
k 1 table[i]= new int[::nodes]; 
//taking one node in random and moving it once for five times 
for(int 1=0;1<5;1++) 
{ 
for( i=O ;i<nodes ;i++) 
{ 
terminals[i].move();//calling move function on the node selected 
} 
I /we then call the call updates fuction on every node to update its k-hop table 
for( i=O ;i<::x ;i++) 
for( int j=O ;j<::y ;j++) 
{ 
} 
if (area[i][j]!=-1) {//for every node if not a free space call the update fuction 
cout< <area[i] [j]<<"\n"; 
terminals [area[i][j]].updatek_table();//calling udate fuction 
} 
/ /printing success rate for every node for FDCA scheme 
cout<<I<<" "<<old_ sucess; 
} 
/ /printing success rate of FDCA and new scheme 
cout<<"old "<<(( old_sucess/5)* I 00)/nodes<<"new 
"<<{(new_ sucess/5)* I 00)/nodes<<"hops"<<(hops/5)<<" "<<(new_ sucess/5); 
/* 
int sucess main=O; 
//loops to findout the number of messages and attempts made 





//take one node in random out of 100 
int node= rand()% 100; 
//checking for successes and get hop count until success 
while(true) 
{ 
for( i=O; i<=nbr;i++)//looping until the k shares hops 
for( int j=O; j<=nodes++) 
kl_table[i][j]= terminals[node].k_table[i][j]; 
messages=messages+: :old_ sucess; 
/ /recording success and hops and messages 
{ 
} 
for( i=O ;i<nodes ;i++) 
Terminals[i].move();//move in random 
terminals[node].updatek_table();//update the table 
int cnt=O; 
for ( int j=O; j<=nodes;j++) 
{ 
//loop for all space which are not free 
for( int j 1 =O; j 1 <=nodes;j 1 ++) 
if(k 1 _ table[O][j 1 ]== terminals[ node ].k _ table[O][j] && 
k l_table[O][j 1] !=-1) 
} 
cnt++; 
sucess _ main=sucess _main+(: :old_ sucess-cnt ); 
attempt++; adding attempts by old scheme 
//finding the success percentage and exit if more than 90% 
if((sucess_ main* 100)/nbr >= 90) 
break; 
} 
; /printing the number of messages in total 
cout<<"total messages="<<attempt+messages; * / 
} . 
//end of main function 
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